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Confusion twice-confounded reigns in the area of federal jurisdiction
described as "standing to sue." That concept, it has been justly ob-
served, is "among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public
law," one of "uncertain content,"' of such complexity that Justice
Frankfurter, a pioneering student of federal jurisdiction, "found him-
self reduced to a nearly unprecedented degree of inarticulateness" in
dealing with one of its many aspects.2 Not a little of the confusion
originated in Frothingham v. Mellon,3 which left uncertain whether
"standing" was a constitutional requirement or simply a "rule of self-
restraint." 4 A contributing factor was Justice Frankfurter's own
attempt to ground the standing doctrine firmly on constitutional
compulsions. In endowing the Court with "judicial Power," he stated,
Article III "presupposed an historic content for that phrase," and in
limiting the sphere of judicial action to "Cases" and "Controversies"
the Framers had reference to "the familiar operations of the English
judicial system," whereunder "D]udicial power could come into play
only in matters that were the traditional concern of the courts in
Westminister and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of
lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies.' "' Given a document
which employed familiar English terms-e.g., "admiralty," bankruptcy,"
"trial by jury"- it is hardly to be doubted that the Framers contem-
plated resort to English practice for elucidation, and so the Suprere
Court has often held.6 Indeed, on the very issue of "judicial Power"
t A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.
1938, Harvard University.
1. Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (March 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. "Uncertainty," said John Streater, invoking a maxim in his defense against
a commitment by Parliament in 1654, is "the mother of all debate and confusion, than
which there is nothing more odious in law." Streater's Case, 5 How. St. Trials 565, 599.
2. L. JAFFE, JUDICUL CONTROL OF ADMINisTRATivE AM'ON 461 (1965).
3. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968).
5. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (dissent). This was a "political question"
case; Justice Frankfurter went on to lift his view to the level of generalized doctrine In
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 125, 150-59 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
6. The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference
to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was
framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted
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Madison emphasized in the Convention that it ought "to be limited to
cases of a Judiciary Nature," implying that past practice would supply
the criterion.7
It has been too easily assumed, however, that English practice had at
its core the necessity of showing injury to a personal interest as a pre-
requisite to an attack on jurisdictional usurpation.8 In seeking to
clarify Frothingham in Flast v. Cohen, moreover, the Court, in my
opinion, has further confused analysis by extracting from the separa-
tion of powers and advisory opinion doctrines "implicit policies em-
bedded in Article III"9 with which to bolster dubious implications
drawn from the "case or controversy" phrase.10 A first step towards
clarification would be to clear the ground of unhistorical notions of
constitutional restrictions, to free consideration of the perplexing and
wide-ranging issues of policy that cluster about the problem of standing
from the constriction of fancied constitutional bonds. I propose to
show that the English practice on which Justice Frankfurter relied
did not in fact demand injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite
it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought
up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its vocabulary.
They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated
in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they
came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be
shortly and easily understood.
Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). As was said in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 563 (1962),
one touchstone of justidability to which this Court has frequently had reference is
whether the action sought to be maintained is of a sort "recognized at the time of
the Constitution to be traditionally within the power of courts in the Englih and
American judicial systems."
See also Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLU.m. L. Rxv. 555,
557 (1939).
7. 2 M. FARRAND, REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CoVEM- roN OF 1787, at 411 (1911) [here-
inafter cited as FAtRAND].
8. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. 123, 151-54 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Professor Bickel deduces from the fact that the judicial power
"may be exercised only in a case," that oturts "may not decide non-cases, which are not
adversary situations and in which nothing of immediate consequence to the parties turns
on the results." Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 HAv. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bickel].
9. 392 US. 83, 96 (1968).
10. That the matter is by no means academic may be deduced from the fact that
Chairman Sam Ervin of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights felt con-
strained in 1966 to call hearings in order to ascertain from divers scholars whether
Congress was empowered to confer standing, not dependent upon a personal interest,
to attack the constitutionality of legislation that would assist the educational and welfare
programs of religious institutions. Hearings 5. In those hearings government counsel
repeatedly urged that such legislation would raise constitutional doubts. Id. 76, 85, 1.27,
137. Professor P. G. Kauper stated that "absent a showing of injury" to the suitor in
some "specific or concrete way," he "would not suppose that Congress has the power to
direct the Federal courts to take jurisdiction of such citizen's suits." Id. 502. Professor
A. S. Miller stated that there is "some doubt of the extent to which Congress can confer
'standing' upon those the Supreme Court has said do not have it." Id. 509.
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to attacks on jurisdictional excesses,' and that neither the separation
of powers nor advisory opinion doctrines as originally envisaged
require insistence on a personal stake as the basic element of standing
to make such challenges.
Unlike "case or controversy," which can summon the express terms
of Article III, "standing" is not mentioned in the Constitution or the
records of the several conventions. It is a judicial construct pure and
simple12 which, in its present sophisticated form, is of relatively recent
origin. Professor Jaffe encountered "no case before 1807 in which the
standing of the plaintiff is mooted . . ,"1 and found that objections
to the standing of a private individual to enforce a "public right" were
first squarely presented in 1897.14 Locus standi was employed by two
English Courts in 1874 and 1879 in not really relevant circumstances, 16
and appears in connection with referral by the House of Commons to
a Court of Reference of objections that certain private bills may in-
terfere with private rights of others.' 6 As late as 1955, an English writer
examining the availability of the writ of certiorari could say that the
subject of locus standi had not been "treated in a satisfactory way by
any one, judge or jurist."' 7 In any case "standing" was neither a term
of art nor a familiar doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Although it has been explained as a description of "the constitutional
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court to 'cases' and 'contto-
11. This is not a novel proposition. In a pathbreaking article, Professor afe sought
to demonstrate via the history of mandamus that "the public action-an action brought
by a private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of
public obligations-has long been a feature of our English and American law." Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 25, 302 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Private Actions], summarizing his companion article, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv. L. Rav. 1265 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Jaffe, Public Actions]. In the latter he noted that Prothingham appealed to "a ques-
tionable dogma." Id. 1266. In Hearings 451, he characterized the requirement that a
plaintiff have "a special, pecuniary interest" as "unhistorical."
12. Jaffe, Private Actions 256.
13. Jaffe, Public Actions 1270. There is an earlier American case, State v. Corporation
of New Brunswick, 1 N.J.L. 393 (1795), in which the argument was made, without employ-
ing the word "standing," and was rejected. For discussion see TAN 99 infra. See note 38
infra for a rejection in a quo warranto case in 1789.
14. Jaffe, Public Actions 1271-72.
15. James v. The Queen, [1874] 5 Ch. D. 153, 160 (one to whom a statute does itt
make a grant has no locus stahdi to compel one to him); In re Cold Co., [1879] 12 Ch,
D. 77, 83.
16. Constable, Principles and Practice Affecting Locus Standi, 9 Jun10. 1tv. 47, 55
(i897): "The principle of locus standi is that there is something In the bill which, If
passed into law, would injure the parties petitioning" (quoting Mr. Richards). The fact
that the words locus standi have riot found their way into the indices of the English
digests itself suggests relative novelty. And to this day in England "there is no serious
trouble over standing (i.e., locus stand:)." Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Lazo:
More Reflections, 82 L.Q. REv. 226, 249 (1966).
17. Yardley, Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi, 71 L.Q. Ev. 388, 993 (1955).
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versies,'"-18 it apparently entered our law via Frothingham in 1923.10
When we turn to pre-Constitution English law for light on the
meaning of "case or controversy," we find that attacks by strangers on
action in excess of jurisdiction were a traditional concern of the courts
in Westminster. The writ of prohibition supplies perhaps the clearest
example. Coke tells us of a complaint by the clergy to the King of un-
due granting of Writs of prohibition by the courts against the exercise
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which the judges were then called upon to
answer. "[A]ll the judges of England, and the barons of the Exchequer,
with one unaminous consent," records Coke, made answer in a docu-
ment known as the Articulo Cleri. In their Third Answer the judges
stated:
Prohibitions by law are to be granted at any time to restraine a
court to intermeddle with, or execute any thing, which by law
they ought not to hold plea of, and they are much mistaken that
maintaine the contrary .... And the kings courts that may award
prohibitions, being informed either by the parties themselves, or
by any stranger, that any court temporall or ecclesiasticall doth
hold plea of that (whereof they have not jurisdiction) may law-
fully prohibit the same, as well after judgement and execution,
as before.2 0
No English court, so far as I can discover, has ever rejected the authority
of Articulo Gleri or denied that a writ of prohibition may be granted at
the suit of a stranger. On the contrary, Coke was cited by the 18th
century Abridgments21 and by English courts throughout the 19th
century,22 and his rule remains the law in England today.2 Thus at
the time of the Revolution, the "courts in Westminster" afforded to a
18. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); C. WIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 36 (1963).
states that "standing to sue is an element of the federal constitutional concept of 'case
or controversy.'" See also note 8 supra.
19. Professor Jaffe states that "[t]he first significant controversy ...concerning stand-
ing had reached the Supreme Court in 1911," but that the Court "found it unnecessary
to decide the standing question." The "criterion of standing was brought into focus" with
Baltimore 9& Ohio .R. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). Jaffe, Private Actions 261-262.
20. 2 E. COKE, INsTTurEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLANDO 602 (1797) [hereinafter cited as
Inst.]. "In Roman law it was open to any citizen to bring an actio popularis in respect
of a public delict or to sue for a prohibitory or restitutory interdict for the protection of
res sacrae and, res publicae." S. DE SiTrrH, JuDictAL RFvIEw OF ADMINISThTIVEv AcrToN
423 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DE S.trrH].
21. 4 J. ComYNS, DIGESr, "Prohibition" (E) (1766); 4 Al. BACON, AunRcmrE:,r, "Prohibi-
tion" (C) (3d ed. 1768).
22. In Wadsworth v. Queen of Spain [1851] 17 Q.B. 171 214, Lord Campbell stated:
"we find it laid down in books of the highest authority that, where the court to which
prohibition is to go has no jurisdiction, a prohibition may be granted upon the request
of a stranger, as well as of the defendant himself. 2 Cor 607; Coin. Dig. Prohibition (E)."
See also Mayor of London v. Cox [1867] L.l. 2 E. & I. App. 239, 279 (H.L.); Worthington
v. Jeffries [1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 379, 383. See note 108 infra.
23. H. WADE, ADMNisTRATIvE LAw 125-26 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as WADE].
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stranger a means of attack on juridictional excesses without requiring
a showing of injury to his personal interest.
Coke was a revered figure in the Colonies, and his record of Articulo
Cleri was presumably familiar to Colonial lawyers.24 In addition, his
doctrine had been picked up by the Bacon and Viner Abridgments,
to which they frequently turned, as well as by the respected Comyns'
Digest.25 Of course the availability of prohibition did not constitute
"common law precedent on standing to attack the constitutionality of
a statute, "20 both because written constitutions were a distinctive
product of post-revolutionary America, and because the doctrine of
"constitutionality" was a peculiarly American development. But a chal-
lenge to action in excess of authority conferred by the Constitution
was well within the rationale of the writ of prohibition.
There was also the analogous practice of certiorari. Both the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, said Lord Atkin,
are of great antiquity, forming part of the process by which the
King's Courts restrained courts of inferior jurisdiction from ex-
ceeding their power. Prohibition restrains the tribunal from pro-
ceeding further in excess of jurisdiction; certiorari requires the
record or order of the court to be sent up to the King's Bench
Division, to have its legality inquired into, and, if necessary, to
have the order quashed. It is to be noted that both writs deal with
questions of excessive juridiction.27
Certiorari, stated Chief Justice Holt in 1702, would issue to examine
the "proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parliament ...
to the end that this court may see that they keep themselves within
their jurisdiction; and if they exceed it, to restrain them." 28 That
certiorari was available to a stranger may be inferred from a 1724 case
24. In New York, "Coke was by all odds the writer most used and cited. There are
many indications that this was true in other provinces." Goebel, supra note 6, at 564 n.25.
Jefferson stated that there never was "one of profounder learning in the orthodox
doctrines of the British Constitution or what is called British rights" than Coke. E. CORWIN,
THE DOCTINE OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 31 n.45 (1914).
25. See note 21 supra; C. VINER, ABRIDGMENT, "Prohibition" (M) 14 (1743). "A lot
of American law came out of Bacon's and Viner's Abridgments." Goebel, Ex Parte Clio,
54 COLUM. L. REv. 450, 455 (1954). Justice Willes stated in Mayor of London v. Cox [1867]
L.R. 2 E. & I. App. 239, 285 (H.L.): "the law is laid down in Comyn's Digest." 2 J. ADAMS,
LEGAL PAPrVS (Wroth & Zobel eds. 1965) contains frequent citations of the Abridgments
by James Otis, Adams, and Blowers. Id. 128 n.73, 163, 228, 269, 284, 341, 350, 424, 428, 430.
26. Jaffe, Public Actions 1308.
27. Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 204-05. Lord Atkin stated
that he could "see no difference in principle between certiorari and prohibition, except
that the latter may be invoked at an earlier stage." Id. at 206.
28. Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorganshire, 91 Eng. Rep. 1287, 1288 (1702) (certiorari
to bring up a levy of moneys to repair Caerdiffe Bridge). If there was a "personal stake"
quaere whether it amounted to a "cause of action." See note 47 infra.
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which drew a distinction between a party aggrieved and "one who
comes merely as a stranger," for purposes of deciding whether issuance
of the writ was discretionary or a matter of right.2 In 1870 an English
court examining the writ looked to "the very analogous case of pro-
hibition,"30 and without an air of fresh-minting law the Court of
Appeal flatly stated in 1957 that "the remedy by certiorari ... extends
to any stranger."3 ' I know of no English case that has denied this
proposition.
Originally, both certiorari and prohibition "dealt almost exclusively
with the jurisdiction of what is described in ordinary parlance as a
Court of Justice";32 but very early they were employed with respect
to what we term "administrative" functions. Because the justices
of the peace were the local county administrators, charged with super-
vising road construction and maintenance, licensing alehouses, setting
wage-scales for laborers and apprentices and administering the poor-
laws, and were at the same time courts of record,33 review of administra-
tive functions was handily accomplished by means of these self-same
writs. As Professor de Smith remarks:
It was assumed that the writs of certiorari and prohibition by
which [the justices] were controlled in their capacity as courts of
summary jurisdiction, were equally appropriate devices for super-
intending the exercise of their multifarious governmental func-
tions. All those functions of the justices which were not purely
ministerial were regarded for this purpose as being judicial: no
separate category of discretionary "administrative" acts, immune
from the reach of certiorari and prohibition, was yet recognised.
A no less broad conception of "judicial" functions governed
review of orders made by the Commissioners of Sewers, who pre-
sided over a court of record which performed administrative
duties under judicial forms.34
29. Arthur v. Commissioners of Sewers, 88 Eng. Rep. 237 (1725). The case was so read
by Justice Blackburn in Regina v. Justices of Surrey, [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 466, 472-73.
30. Id. at 472.
31. Regina v. Thames Magistrates Court, ex parte Greenbaum [1957] Local Gov't Rep.
129, 132, 135-36. In England
an applicant for certiorari or prohibition does not have to show that some legal
right of his is at stake. If the action is an excess or abuse of power, the court will
quash it at the instance of a mere stranger ... [T]hese remedies are not restricted by
the notion of locus standi. Every citizen has standing to invite the court to prevent
some abuse of power, and in doing so he may claim to be regarded not as a meddle-
some busybody but as a public benefactor.
WADE 125-26.
32. Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205.
33. DE SmrrH 386-87; E. HENDERsON, FouNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADkSNisTRATivE LAW 18-
25 (1963) [hereinafter cited as HENDERSON].
34. DE SMrIT 387. Review of a non-judicial function of the Commissioners is illustrated
by Arthur v. Commissioners of Sewers, 88 Eng. Rep. 237 (1725), in which certiorari
brought up an order ousting plaintiff who had been chosen by the Commissioners as
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In the course of the meandering development of English administra-
tive law many such functions were transferred from "courts of record"
to administrative agencies. In keeping with existing practice Parliament
not infrequently provided for review by certiorari-as, for example,
in the case of Poor Law administration. And despite the lack of such
express provisions in other statutes, from which the courts might have
inferred that Parliament intended to exclude certiorari in certain
cases, it was concluded instead that "common-law certiorari and pro-
hibition could properly issue to other authorities discharging similar
functions."3 In one such case the court rejected an attempt by the
Inclosure Commissioners to question whether prohibition would lie
to review an attempted enclosure with the remark that the case was
"too clear." 36 Evaluation of a colonial lawyer's hypothetical appraisal
of English practice in curbing action in excess of jurisdiction should
not therefore be made to turn on a "court of record" distinction which
the English judiciary, so respectful of precedent, found of no moment.
Colonial observers would see administrative functions being reviewed
their clerk at an earlier meeting. If, as Professor Heuiderson erpphasizes, the Commis-
sioners, like the justices of the peace, were courts of record, HENDERoN 112, 116, the
predominant consideration iyas prevention of jurisdictipnal excesses, as two notable
utterances testify. In Commins v. Massam, Marth 196 (1643), Justice Heath stated:
notwithstanding that the act leaves the proceedings to the discretion of the Com-
missioners [of Sewers], nevertheless this discretion is examinable and controllable In
this Court. Suppose that the Commissioners do anything without or against tteiir
commission, without doubt this is reformable and examinable here.
Quoted in HENDERSON 146. In the Caerdiffe Bridge Case (Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorgan-
shire, 91 Eng. Rep. 1287 (1702)), the justices of the peace had levied money for repair
of the bridge, and objection to certiorari was made that 4 new statute h.d reppsed the
jurisdiction, i.e., the discretion, in the justices. To this Chief Justice Holt replied:
this Court will examine the 'proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parlia.
ment. And if they, under pretense of such Act, proceed to incroach jurisdiction to
themselves greater than the Act warrants, this Ct~rt will sepd a certiorari to them
: * . to the end that this Court my 'see, that they keep themselves' within their
jurisdiction, and if they exceed it, to restrain them.
Id. at 1288.
35. DE SMITH 388.
36. Church v. Inclosure Commissioners, 142 Eng. Rep. 956 (1862). Rex y. Electricity
Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 209, noted this act of a distinguished bench.
The relevance of the early cases was made explicit in 1924 when Rex v. E(ectricilty Cor-
missioners pointed to the Caordiffo holding that "certiorari lies to juqticps of peace In a
county in respect of a statutory duty to fix a rate for the repair of a county bridge.'f Id.
205. Stress in that case upon the "judicial" nature of the reviewable administrative
function is to be read agairlst the facts: "the Electricity Commissioners have tq decide
whether they will constitute a joint authority in a district in accordance with law, and
with what powers they will invest that body.!' In !'deciding uporn the scheme aell in
holding the inquiry, they are acting judicially ..... Id. 206-07. Professor Hendprson
reminds us that the orders issued by the early courts of record are "very different from
the judicial business 'between party and party' which is characteristic of courts of
record." HENDERSON 116.
It would have been anomalous indeed had agency excpsseq been given immunity dtnied
to judicial usurpations, and this at a time when deference to vaunted agency expertise
lay far in the future. In applying the Caerdiffe ruling to purely administrative agencies
the English courts were true to the common law canon that the scope of a principle is
not limited to the facts that fortuitously gave it birth.
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withotit reason to cohclude that future transfers from courts of record
to administrative agencies would liberate those functions from sur-
veillance.
In addition to prohibition and certiorari there were other writs,
which had no "court of record" antecedents. An information in the
nature of quo warranto antedates the statute of 9 Anne, which allowed
anyone who so desired to make use of the name of the Clerk of the
Crown, with the leave of Court, for the purpose of prosecuting usurpers
of franchises.37 The breadth of the statute envisaged suits by a stranger;
and at least one case in 178938 held that the writ was available to a
stranger, as had earlier been held with respect to other prerogative
writs. The analogy to prohibition was clearly drawn in 1915, when
Lord Reading observed that "a stranger to a suit can obtain pro-
hibition. .. and I see no reason why he should not in a proper case
obtain an information of quo wvarranto." 39
Professor Jaffe considers mandamus and injunctions as the "most
significant prototypes the public action," certiorari of "considerably
lesser significance," and prohibition and quo warranto least important
of all.40 As a rdsum6 of the American development this is unexcep-
tionable, but it probably was not intended to describe the course of
events in England, where the availability of prohibition and quo
warranto as public actions, as Professor Jaffe himself notes, "has been
clearer than that of either mandamus or injunction"41 and where even
today certiorari and prohibition remain available to strangers.42 Since
37. 9 Anne, c. 20 (1710). See Rex v. Trelawney, 97 Eng. Rep. 1010 (176); J. Sitonri.
INFORMATIONS (CRIMINAL AND Quo VARRANTO) MANDAMUS AND PRonmmoN 112-14 (1888)
[hereinafter cited as SHORr].
38. Rex v. Smith, 100 Eng. Rep. 740 (1790), contains a note on Rex v. Brown (1789),
which was an information in the nature of quo warranto that councilmen were under
disqualification because they had not received the sacrament within twelve months
previous to the election as required by statute. Erskine argued that "it does not appear
here that the party making the application has any connection with the corporation."
Lord Kenyon, however, held: "We are bound to grant this information. The law has said
that the magistracy of the country shall be in the hands of those who profess the religion
of the Church of England." Justice Ashurst added: "the ground on which this application
is made is to enforce a general Act of Parliament, which interests all the corporations in
the kingdom; and therefore it is no objection that the party appl)ing is not a memnber
of the corporation."
Cf. Rex v. Mayor of Hartford, 91 Eng. Rep. 325 (1700), where quo warranto issued
against the mayor and aldermen of Hartford to show "by what authority they admitted
persons to be freemen of the corporation who did not inhabit in the borough. The motion
was pretended to be on behalf of the freemen, u ho by this means were encroached upon."
See note 47 infra.
39. Rex v. Speyer [1916] L.R. 1 K.B. 595, 613. "Every subject,' said Justice LuAh "has
an interest in securing that public duties shall be exercised only by those competent to
exercise them .... " Id. at 628,
40. Jaffe, Public Actions 1269.
41. Id.
42. See note 31 supra.
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my concern is with the state of English law before 1787, with the
question whether that law, as viewed by the Framers, could be under-
stood to permit attacks by strangers upon jurisdictional usurpations,
the early English practice in prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto,
which permitted such attacks, is for me the more significant.
For purposes of such attacks, I suggest, the early English mandamus
practice was not highly relevant. Mandamus was largely designed to
compel action by one who was under a duty to act, who was authorized
to act in the premises; it was not a vehicle for the restraint of unautho-
rized action. As Blackstone put the distinction, mandamus was used to
direct persons, corporations or inferior courts "to do some particular
thing ... which appertains to their office and duty," while "encroach-
ment of jurisdiction, or calling one coram non judice, to answer in a
court which has no legal cognizance of the cause, is . . . a grievance
for which the common law has provided a remedy by the writ of
prohibition." 43
Mandamus, however, did have an important complementary role to
play in the enforcement of duties colored with a public interest, duties
in which the "personal interest" did not rise to the dignity of a "cause
of action." In 1652 mandamus was granted to the parishioners and offi-
cers of the parish of Clerkenwell "to make scavengers that are elected
to that office to serve the office." 44 In the Case of the Borough of Bossiny
mandamus issued to hold an election for mayor; 4 , a mandamus com-
manded in 1733 that an election be held to fill a vacancy on the corpo-
ration of Esham;46 and it had issued in 1698 to compel justices of the
peace "to make rates for the relief of the poor. ' 47 From such cases a
colonial lawyer might well have concluded that mandamus was
capable of issuance at the suit of a stranger who sought to assert the
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 110-11. 3 M. BACON, ABRIDGMENT, "Mandamus"(A) (3d ed. 1768) states that the writ was used "to oblige inferior Courts and Magistrates
to do that Justice, which, without such Writ, they are in Duty, and by virtue of their
Offices, obliged to do." Compare J. CoMYNS, DicEasT, "Mandamus" (B) (1766): it "does not
lie to prevent a Molestation against Law: As not to molest a Preacher." Regina v. I'each,
91 Eng. Rep. 482 (1705). In denying a writ in such circumstances, Peat's Case, 87 Eng.
Rep. 979 (1704), explained that "a mandamus is always to do something in execution
of law."
44. Anonymous, 82 Eng. Rep. 765 (1652).
45. 93 Eng. Rep. 996 (1735).
46. Anonymous, 94 Eng. Rep. 471 (1733).
47. Lidleston v. Mayor of Exeter, 90 Eng. Rep. 567 (1697).
Such cases, as well as Rex v. Mayor of Hartford, discussed supra note 88, and Rex v.
Inhabitants of Glamorganshire, supra note 28, speak against the narrow requirement of
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 140 (1939), that a plaintiff who would
complain of invalid action must show injury to "a legal right-one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a
statute which confers a privilege."
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public interest,48 especially because the analogy of mandamus to pro-
hibition was early drawn, and because Coke, who had unequivocally
stated the availability of prohibition to strangers, also made a massive
assertion of mandamus jurisdiction.40 To King's Bench, he declared in
James Baggs' Case,
belongs authority, not only to correct error in judicial proceedings,
but other errors and misdemeanors extrajudicial, tending to
breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects, or to the raising of
faction, controversy, debate or any manner of misgovernment,
so that no wrong or injury, either private or public, can be done
but what it shall be here reformed or punished by due course of
law.50
This was not long after Articulo Cleri had categorically asserted the
right of strangers to attack jurisdictional usurpations in prohibition
proceedings. Scarcely less encompassing was Lord Mansfield's state-
ment in 1762 that mandamus
was introduced to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and
defect of police. Therefore, it ought to be used upon all occasions
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in
justice and good government there ought to be one.51
The fact that mandamus subsequently "developed along more modest
lines"52 should not obscure the potential effect of these grandiose claims
on the minds of the Founders. In weighing whether "case or contro-
versy" was framed restrictively, we should not too hastily assume that
the contemporary view was ours, but rather should consider that
Coke's and Mansfield's sweeping assertions of mandamus jurisdiction
reflected English practice in other prerogative writsYr1
The early English practice in prohibition, certiorari, and quo war-
ranto is not the sole indication of easy access to "public actions"; there
were in addition the centuries-old "informers" actions. These went
beyond making available procedures to control unlawful conduct, and
48. Professor Jaffe points out that "the lists of the cases in the digests strongly suggest
that the plaintiff in some of them was without a personal interest." Jaffe, Public Actions
1270. Case titles furnish no dues because the King or Queen are "invariably the prosecu-
tors of the writ." T. TAPPING, Tim LAW AND PRACTICE OF TBE HIGH PREROGATIVE WRrr
OF MANDA .rUS at viii (1848). Cf. note 57 infra.
49. E. HENDERsoN 72; Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law:
Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345, 559 (1956).
50. 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1277-78 (1615).
51. Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (1762).
52. Jaffe g- Henderson, supra note 49, at 260.
53, De Smith notes that Mansfield seems to have been the first to perceive the dose
relationship between what are now classed as the "prerogative" writs. DE Sssrn 384.
825
The Yale Law Journal
offered financial inducements to strangers to prosecute such actions,
provided for by a "very large" number of statutes "in which the public
at large was encouraged to enforce obedience to statutes by the promise
of a share of the penalty imposed for disobedience. . ."0 Such informers
had "no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by
statute," 55 and the pecuniary reward thus offered to strangers was little
calculated to lead colonial lawyers to read cognate remedies narrowly.
There were also the "relator" actions, deriving from the Crown's
duty "to see that public bodies kept within their lawful powers."' 0
Blackstone cites the quo warranto statute of Queen Anne for a suit
"at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the same, (who is
then styled the relator) .... ,"57 The relator action flourished in England,
where it is brought by the Attorney General "at the relation (i.e., at the
instance) of some other person," being a proceeding "against any public
authority which is abusing its power." 8 "It is not absolutely necessary,"
said Lord Hardwicke in 1741, that "relators in an information for a
charity, should be the persons principally interested .... [A]ny persons,
though the most remote in the contemplation of the charity, may be
relators in these cases"; and other cases dispensed with "the least
particle of interest." 59
54. 4 IV. HoLDsWoRTn, A HiSroRY OF ENGLISH LAW 356 (2d ed. 1937).55. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905): "Statutes providing for actions by a
common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other thanthat given by statute, have been in existence hundreds of years in England, and in this
country ever since the foundation of our Government." The use of such actions to police
official misconduct is noted by Blackstone, who refers to suits for forfeitures by persons
who "being in particular offices . . . neglect to take the oaths to the government; whichpenalty is given to him or them that will sue for the same." 2 W. B.AcKsroNE, Com-
AIENTARIES* 437. A New York informer's statute of 1692 to restrain privateers and piratesprovides for one-half the recovery of fines against an "officer that shall omitt or neglecthis duty herein." SUPREME COURT OF THE JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF Npiv YORK, 1691-
1704, 30 n.77, 71 n.74 (1959).
56. WADE 113.57. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4 264. He also alludes to informations exhibitedin the name of the king, in which, "though the king is the nominal prosecutor, yet Itis at the relation of some private person or common informer . . ." 4 id.* 308. A couple
of pre-1788 relator cases are Attorney General v. Parker, 26 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1747)(action to set aside election to a curacy); Attorney General v. Middleton, 28 Eng. Rep.210 (1751) (action concerning charitable trust for a school; dismissed because colored by
relator's private motive of revenge).
58. WADE 113.
59. Attorney General v. Bucknall, 26 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch. 1741). See Rex v. Mayor ofHartford, 91 Eng. Rep. 325 (1700). See also Attorney General v, Vivian, 38 Eng. Rep. 88,92 (1825): "The character of relator . . . does not seem to require the least particle ofprivate interest in the due administration of that charity." To the same effect see AttorneyGeneral v. Logan, [1891] L.R. 2 Q.B. 100, 103. Professor Wade states thatTo require public authorities to keep within their powers generally is not norm,lythe business of the ordinary citizen. But it is the business of the Crown, and theCrown will lend its help to any subject who reasonably wants to borrow-or ratherto hire-it .... [lit is a beneficial arrangement, since it enables a private citizen to
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At the adoption of the Constitution, in sum, the English practice in
prohibition, certiorari, quo warrarnto, and informers' and relators'
actions encouraged strangers to attack unauthorized action. So far as
the requirement of standing is "used to describe the constitutional
limitation on the jurisdiction of this Court to 'cases' and 'contro-
versies' ;6O so far as "case" and "controversy" and "judicial power"
"presuppose an historic content"; 1 and so far as the index of that
content is the "business of the . courts of Westminster when the
Constitu4on was framed," 62 the argument for a constitutional bar to
strangers as complainants against unconstitutional action seems to me
without foundation. When the Court stated in Flast v. Cohen that
in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction,
the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.
It is for that reason that the emphasis ... is on .. . "a personal
stake in the outcome" of the controversy,63
it misinterpreted English history. For that history discloses that one
without a "personal stake," a mere stranger to the action complained
of, was allowed to initiate and maintain an "adversary" proceeding
in the public interest to challenge a jurisdictional usurpation. Such
a proceeding was "historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."
Those who would complain that the evidence of English practice is
scanty should remember that the argument to the contrary rests on no
evidence at all, but on the mistaken assumption that the practice in
such strictly private actions as tort and contract governed "public
actions" as well.
64
Professor Finer states that the Attorney General "invariably permits the use of his
name." H. FINER, ENGLiSH LOCAL Gov.apNNIEN 220 (4th ed. 1950). quoted in Jaffe, Public
Actions 1274.
60. Barrows v. Jackson, 340 U.. 249, 255 (1953); cf. C. Wwurarr, FrnML Cougrs 36(1963); Bickel 42.
61. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. 123. 150 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). See TAN 5 supra.
63. 392 US. at 101. "If our constitutional notions of proper judicial business are
grounded to a significant degree in history it is next to impossible to conclude-as was
attempted in Frothingham-that a taxpayer's action does not fulfill the constitutional
requisites of case or controversy." Jaffe, Private Actions 302.
Justice Harlan was closer to the mark in concluding that non-personal stake public
actions are "within the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article 1U."
392 U.S. at 130. See also id. at 120.
64. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 US. 118, 140 (1939). Even when
tempted to disbelieve a witness, courts have said that "Mere disbelief of testimony [not
inherently incredible] is not the equivalent of evidence to the contrary." Phillips v.
Gookin, 231 Mass. 250, 251, 120 N.E. 691 (1918); Mosson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 1241
F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1942); Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R.R., 164 F.2d 996, 999 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1947); Magg v. Miller, 296 F. 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
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Possibly entertaining doubts about Justice Frankfurter's reference
to the "practices of the courts of Westminster," Flast v. Cohen adverted
to the "uncertain historical antecedents of the case and controversy
doctrine" and sought to bolster it by arguments derived from the
separation of powers and advisory opinion doctrines, emerging with
what were termed "implicit policies embodied in Article III."'c The
phrase "cases and controversies" was explained primarily as defining
"the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power
to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of the government." 60
Overemphasis of the "separation of powers," however, is apt to ob-
scure the no less important system of "checks and balances." Judicial
checks on legislative excesses represent a deliberate and considered
departure from an abstractly perfect separation of powers, part of
what Madison called a necessary "blending" of powers that was re-
quired to make the separation work.0 7 Litigation that challenges un-
65. 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968).
66. Id. at 95. The Court was careful to separate the issue of "capacity to sue" from
the question whether it had Article III jurisdiction of the subject matter.
" W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose
standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue
and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 99-100.
In Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1288, 1342(1965), I directed attention to the fact that this distinction had been drawn in Tileston
v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943): "Since the appeal must be dismissed on the ground
that appellant has no standing to litigate the constitutional question .. . it is unnecessary
to consider whether the record shows the existence of a genuine case or controversy
essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court"; and also noticed in willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928), where, although there was "no
lack of a substantial interest of the plaintiff in the question" of standing, Justice Brandeis
concluded that "still the proceeding is not a case or controversy within the meaning of
Article III..."
For a similar differentiation in the field of conflicts between the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter-the power confided by a state to decide in the premises--
and the capacity of a party to sue, see A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws 35, 71, 72, 120
(1962).
Flast goes on to state that whether "a particular person is a proper party to maintain
the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to
improper judicial interference with other branches." 392 U.S. at 100. Then, after stating
that "in deciding the question of standing, it is not relevant that the substantive Issues
in the litigation might be non-justiciable," Flast declares that it is "necessary to look
to the substantive issues . . . to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the
status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." Id. at 101-02. How the Irrelevant
thus again becomes relevant is too subtle for my comprehension.
67. Explaining the limitations of the separation of powers doctrine in Federalist 47,
Madison said that Montesquieu "did not mean that these departments ought to have
. . . no control over, the acts of each other." In No. 48 he stated that "unless these
departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control
over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained." So too, Davie met criticism In
the North Carolina convention with the reply that
Montesquieu, at the same time he laid down this maxim, was writing in praise of
the British government. At the very time he recommended this distinction of powers,
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constitutional legislation does not constitute an "improper interference"
with nor an "intrusion" into the legislative domain. No authority to
make laws in excess of granted powers was "committed" to Congress;
instead courts were authorized to check Congressional excesses. "Case
or controversy," to be sure, seeks to confine the courts to what Madison
termed cases of a "judiciary nature" as distinguished from a roving
revision of legislation. Legislation is emphatically not for the courts;
but after the legislative process is completed the courts may decide in
the frame of litigation that a statute is invalid as a legislative usurpa-
tion.6s A legislative usurpation does not change character when it is
challenged by a stranger; and judicial restraint thereon remains a
"judicial" function, not an "intrusion," though undertaken at the call
of one without a personal stake. 9 No hint that judicial restraint of
legislative usurpation was to hinge on the suitor's "interest" is to be
found in the records of the Constitutional Convention. Having made
review available to curb usurpations of power not "committed" to
Congress, the Founders could assume that traditional remedies in
"cases" of a "judiciary nature" would be available to curb such excesses,
he passed the highest eulogium on a constitution wherein they were all partially
blended.
4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONvENTIONs ON TIlE ADOPTION OF TIUE FEDERAL
CONsTrruTION 121 (1881). See also Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers,
37 HAzv. IL REV. 1010 (1924). In short, the separation of powers was tempered by a
system of "checks and balances," and the reach of the separation in a given case must be
evaluated against the purpose that the given "check" was to serve.
68. For this reason, Justice Harlan seems to me mistaken in saying that "unrestricted
public actions" would "go far toward the final transformation of this Court into the
Council of Revision which, despite Madison's support, was rejected by the Constitutional
Convention." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130 (1968) (dissent). For that Council was to
participate in the enacting process by way of an Executive veto (in which the judges
would take part), as distinguished from judicial review after enactment and in the course
of litigation. The matter was put in a nutshell by James Wilson, who argued in behalf
of judicial participation in the Council that "[i]t will be better to prevent the passage
of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed." 2 FARaRAND 391. King urged
the exclusion of judges because they "ought to be able to expound the law as it should
come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation.' I id. 98.
Charles Pinckney also objected that such participation would "give a previous tincture
to their opinions." 2 id. 298. See also Gerry, I id. 97. The Council of Revision was
rejected, judicial participation and all.
That the judicial function was to begin after completion of the legislative process
appears again in Wilson's statement to the Pennsylvania convention:
it is possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds assigned to it.
and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but
when it comes to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its principles,
and find it incompatible with the superior power of the Consttuton,-it is their
duty to pronounce it void.
2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 67, at 446.
69. Compare the reasoning of Justice Brett, infra note 108. Professor Jaffe also finds
it difficult to accept the conclusion "that an issue in every other respect apt for judicial
determination should be non-justiciable because there is no possibility of a conventional
plaintiff-an issue in short in which every one has a legitimate interest but only as a
citizen." Jaffe, Private Actions 305.
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particularly in light of their desire to leave all channels open for
attacks on congressional self-aggrandizement.7 0
The history of advisory opinions similarly lends small comfort to
insistence on a personal stake in protests against unconstitutional
action. That history exhibits not so much a shrinking from "improper
interference" with Congress as a desire to shield the judicial invalida-
tion of statutes from the "bias" of prior advice to Congress, a considera-
tion that bulked large with the Framers. 1 When Jefferson asked Chief
Justice Jay in 1793 whether President Washington might avail himself
of the advice of the Justices on questions arising out of the Franco-
British war, Jay called attention to the fact that the constitutional
authority to call for the opinion of the Cabinet "seems to have been
purposely as well as expressly limited to the executive departments."72
In addition, Jay remarked that the three departments "being in certain
respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in
the last resort, are considerations which afford arguments against the
propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to. .. ,,3
By this time several Justices had decided in a number of cases on
Circuit, in one of which Chief Justice Jay participated,74 that, as Jus-
tice Chase phrased it in 1800, "the supreme court can declare an act of
congress to be unconstitutional and therefore, invalid . . ."7 Jay's
70. See p. 834 infra.
71. Hamilton explained in Federalist 73 that one reason judges were exchded from
the executive veto was that "the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might
receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary
capacities .... " Hamilton is richly confirmed by the statements of the framers themselves.
Strong opposed judicial participation in the Council of Revision because "[t]he Judges
in exercising the function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken,
in framing the laws." 2 FARRAND 75. To the same effect see Gorham, id. 79, Rutledge,
id. 80, Pinckney, 2 id. 298. King urged exclusion of the judges because "they ought to be
able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having
participated in its formation." 1 id. 98.
72. 3 H. JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486.89 (1891).In the convention Charles Pinckney had proposed a provision which would anthorize
both Congress and the President "to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court
upon important questions of law . . ." That provision was referred to the Committee
on Detail and was heard of no more. FARPRAN'1D 341, 334. Instead there emerged the present
Article II, Section 2, clause 1 provision authorizing the President to require the opinions
of the Departnents.
73. 3 H. JOHNSTON, supra note 72, at 486-89.
74. The Circuit Court cases are reported in a note to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
408, 409-14 (1792); that of Jay's Circuit at 409.
75. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S, (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800):
It is, indeed, a general opinion, it is expressly admitted by all this bar, and
some of the judges have, individually, in the circuits, decided, that the supreme court
can declare an act of congress to be unconstitutional, and therefore, invalid; but
there is no adjudication of the supreme court itself upon the point. I concur, how-
ever, in the general sentiment ....
Earlier Justice IreddIl had adverted to the judicial power to set aside unconstitutional
acts in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), andin Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall,)
386, 395, 399 (1798).
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emphasis that the courts were to serve as a check on the other depart-
ments indicates that the chief objection to "advisory opinions" was
that the Justices were loath to render "extra-judicial" advice on ques-
tions that might later come before them for judicial decision. His
desire to insulate constitutional decisions from the tug of prior judicial
advice suggests no fear of improper intrusion into the congressional
sphere; nor would decision of a stranger's suit render probable a
biased declaration of unconstitutionality. In view of the fact that under
the English practice attacks on jurisdictional excesses had traditionally
been welcome, a logical nexus between "advice" and such attacks
needs to be demonstrated, not assumed.70 So, too, Professor Frank-
furter's argument against submission to the courts for advice of "legisla-
tive proposals rather than deliberate enactments," and his statement
that such "advisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmo-
sphere"77 can have little bearing on a suit instituted by the American
Civil Liberties Union to test an already enacted measure."8 An advisory
opinion in response to a Congressional solicitation may be undesirable
for a variety of reasons of policy, but it cannot be said to constitute an
"intrusion" or "improper interference." 70 Its only relevance to the
76. At least as regards a stranger's attack on unconstitutional action, the Flast state-
ment that "the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by
Article I1," 392 U.S. at 96, seems to me unilluminating.
77. FranMkfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1 E cYc. Soc. Sci. 475, 478 (1930).
78. For the founders, "advice" to Congress before enactment was altogether different
from adjudication of a suit challenging the constitutionality of an enacted bill. If this
seems an uncertain distinction to our subtle-minded generation, it was amply dear to
the founders. See note 68 supra.
79. Even less can the term "intrusion" be applied to a statute whereby Congress
authorizes a stranger to challenge the constitutionality of a law. Judicial entry in re-
sponse to an invitation cannot constitute an "improper interference." From the beginning.
the First Congress recognized that its own constitutional interpretations as a prelude to
legislating were necessarily subject to judicial review. Thus, Peter Sylvester said, "If we
are wrong, they can correct our error," I ANNALS OF CoNG. 585 (1789) (1834) (print bear-
ing running page-head: Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress); John
Lawrence: "If the laws shall be in violation of any part of the Constitution, the judges
will not hesitate to decide against them," id. 505; Fisher Ames: "if we declare improperly
the judiciary will revise our decision," id. 496; Abraham Baldwin: "if tlie find this
clause to be unconstitutional, they will not hesitate to declare it so," id. 58.; Elbridge
Gerry: "Our exposition, therefore, would be subject to their revisal," id. 596.
The possibility that thereby he might be saved from his mistakes, said Congressman
Elias Boudinot, gave him added confidence in carrying out his legislative tasks:
The last objection was that by adopting this bill [of which Boudinot was a pro-
ponent] we exposed the measure to be considered and defeated by the Judiciary . . .
who might adjudge it to be contrary to the Constitution, and therefore void ....
This, he alleged, gave him no uneasiness. He was so far from controverting this
right in the Judiciary, that it was his boast and his confidence. It led him to greater
decision on all subjects of a constitutional nature, whien he recflcted that if, from
inattention, want of precision, or any other defect, hie should do wrong, that there
was a power in the Government which could constitutionally prevent the opera-
tion of such a wrong measure from effecting his constituents. He was legislating
for a nation, and for thousands unborn; and it was the glory of the Constitution
that there was a remedy even for the failures of the supreme Iegislature itself.
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"standing" issue lies in its character as a non-judicial, non-"case or
controversy" function; and in that aspect it is irrelevant to the pro-
priety of a stranger's suit which was traditionally adjudicated by the
English courts and was therefore comprehended as a "case" of a
"judiciary nature."
But, it may be asked, does it follow that American judges, acting
under a novel written constitution that set up three co-equal branches,
were bound to follow the English practice when strangers attacked
unconstitutional actions by Congress or the President? For the Ameri-
can legislature and executive occupied a far more exalted position than
the petty officials and inferior courts that the King's Bench had been
wont to keep in bounds.
We must remember that the present stature of Congress by no means
corresponds to the place it occupied in the minds of the Founders. For
them Congress was an object not of awe but of apprehension. They
were far more anxious to defend against unconstitutional action by
Congress than were English judges to curb unauthorized action by
subordinate public bodies. At the several conventions the atmosphere
was charged with an almost obsessive concern with Congressional
"usurpations," and a drumfire of criticism was directed against feared
congressional "tyranny" and "oppression." A few examples must suffice.
Gouverneur Morris considered "[l]egislative tyranny the great danger
to be apprehended."80 Without "effective checks" against legislative
"encroachments," said Madison, "a revolution . . . would be inev-
itable."8' James Wilson warned against the danger of "legislative despo-
tism. 8 2 This from advocates of the Constitution. In the Ratification
conventions opponents such as Patrick Henry said, "I trust I shall see
Congressional oppression crushed in embryo. ' '83 In North Carolina,
Timothy Bloodworth warned that "[w]ithout the most express restric-
2 ANNALS, supra at 1978-79 [1791]. In his Lectures on the Law in 1791, justice James
Wilson, who had been a leading participant in both the federal and Pennsylvania
Ratification conventions, and was then also Professor of Law, quoted Boudinot's statement.
1 J. WILsoN, WORKS 330-31 (McCloskey ed. 1967).
80. 2 FARRAND 551, 76.
81. Id. 35. Though Madison and Morris were here concerned with state excesses,
Madison also referred to the "strong propensity" of state legislatures "to a variety of
pernicious measures" and stressed the need "to controul the Nat]. Legislre. so far as It
might be infected with a similar propensity." 2 id. 110. Mason stated that the national
legislature "would so much resemble that of the individual States, that it must be ex-
pected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws. This restraining power was there-
foe essentially necessary." Id. 78. "All agree," said Nathaniel Gorham, 'that a check on
the Legislature is necessary." Id. 79.
82. 1 id. 261: "May there not be legislative despotism if in the exercise of their
power they are unchecked or unrestrained by another branch?"
83. 3 ELLIOT 546; cf. id. 396.
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tons," going beyond those contained in the proposed Constitution,
"Congress may trample on your rights."84 There were others.8 5
To quiet such fears there were repeated assurances that Congress
"has no power but what is expressly given it,"8 that it has "no author-
ity" to make a law "beyond the powers" enumerated, 7 that "[filf
Congress, under pretence of executing one power should in fact usurp
another, they will violate the Constitution."88 The legislature, said
Archibald Maclaine in North Carolina, "cannot travel beyond [the
Constitution's] bounds"; 9 it cannot, Governor Johnston added, "as-
sume any other powers than those expressly given [it], without a
palpable violation of the Constitution."9 A law "not warranted by the
Constitution," said James Iredell, a leader of the adoption forces in the
same convention, "is barefaced usurpation."91 Lee assured the Virginia
convention that "[w]hen a question arises with respect to the legality
of any power, exercised or assumed by Congress" the question will be
"Is it enumerated in the Constitution?... It is othenvise arbitrary and
unconstitutional." 92 As Iredell said in North Carolina, "the question
...will always be, whether Congress had exceeded its authority." 3
Any assumption that congressional excesses were regarded more in-
dulgently than were the "usurpations" of the English magistracy simply
84. 4 id. 167.
85. E.g., William Lenoir in North Carolina: "When we consider tie great powers of
Congress, there is great cause for alarm." Id. 203. "Let us," William Lancaster there
said, "exclude the possibility of tyranny," id. 213; and William Goudy warned, "beware
the iron glove of tyranny." Id. 10. The ratification debates are replete with remarks to
the same effect. See generally R. BERcER, Coxcss v. THE Surn_%tE Count (to be pub-
lished: Harvard University Press, 1969). As Jefferson was later to say:
It is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind
down those whom we are obliged to trust with power. Our Constitution has ac-
cordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further, our confidence will go. In ques-
tions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him
down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.
Quoted in C. WARRFN, CONGRESS, THE CoNsTrrrTroN AND THE SUPREME COURT 153 (1925).
86. 3 ELUOT 464 (Randolph).
87. 4 Id. 166 (MacLaine). In Massachusetts, Samuel Stillman acknowledged that Con-
gressional powers were "great and extensive" but maintained that they are "defined and
limited, and ... sufficiently checked." 2 id. 166.
88. 4 id. 179 (Iredell).
89. Id. 63; see also id. 140-41.
90. Id. 142.
91. Id. 194.
92. 3 Id. 186.
93. 4 id. 179. Earlier Iredell expressed the "utmost satisfaction" with tie "jealousy
and extreme caution with which gentlemen consider every power to be given to this
government." 4 id. 95. See also p. 834 infra.
When Chief Justice Shaw relied on "respect for the legislature" and "well-establihed
principles" to bar a stranger's assault on a state law, Wellington, Petr., 16 Pick. (33
Mass.) 87, 96 (1834), he did not, of course, take account of the relevant history of the
Federal Constitution, nor did he mention the relevant English practice in prohibition.
certiorari, and the like, but concluded that an unconstitutional Act was merely toidable,
not void, and consequently could be challenged only by those persons whose rights were
affected.
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does violence to the facts. Rather, I would say, the founders raised the
English policy of policing jurisdictional excesses to the highest power.
In the process they were not content with assurances that congres-
sional transgressions would be void and would be so declared by the
courts,94 but stressed that all channels of resistance remained open.
Thus Parsons stated in the Massachusetts convention that "[a]n act
of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be
justified in his resistance." 95 In North Carolina Steele said, "[i]f the
Congress make laws inconsistent with the Constitution, independent
judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them. A univer-
sal resistance will ensue." 96 Even so fervid a proponent of judicial re-
view as Iredell said that "[t]he people will resist if the government
usurp powers not delegated to it."97 Would proponents of the Consti-
tution have preferred "universal resistance" to a suit by a disinterested
representative of the public interest that would resolve the issue peace-
ably? One who pores over the ratification debates is driven to conclude
that the founders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism
that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds.
Two early, post-1787 state cases indicate how naturally American
courts did in fact adapt English practice to the problem of dealing
with invalid laws. Zyistra v. Charleston arose on a motion for a prohibi-
tion to restrain an inferior court from levying a fine (under a city
ordinance) that was allegedly "unconstitutional and out of its jurisdic-
tion." The threatened action was held "void, as being contrary to the
constitution of the state," and a prohibition issued. 8 In State v. Cor-
poration of New Brunswick a citizen moved for certiorari to the mayor
to return a by-law of the corporation in order to test its validity. Against
94. In Federalist 78, Hamilton alluded to the "clear principle" that "every act ofdelegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission, under which it is exercised,is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, call be valid." IfCongress exceeds its powers, said George Nicholas in the Virginia convention, "thejudiciary will declare it void." 3 ELLIOT 443. Samuel Adams said in the Massachusetts
convention that "any law ... beyond the power granted by the proposed constitution , . .[will be] adjudged by the courts of law to be void." 2 id. 131. Oliver Ellsworth told theConnecticut convention that "a law which the Constitution does not authorize" is void,
and the judges "will declare it to be void." Id. 196. Similar statements were made byWilson in Pennsylvania, 2 id. 446, and by John Marshall in Virginia, 3 id. 553.
95. 2 id. 94.
96. 4 id. 71.97. Id. 185. In the First Congress Madison referred to "the general principle, that
laws are unconstitutional, which infringe rights of the community" 1 ANNALS, supra
note 79, at 458 [1789]. Colonists considered that "no obedience is due to arbitrary, un.
constitutional edicts," and that "the invasion of the liberties of the people 'constitutes a
state of war with the people' who may use 'all the power which God has given to them' toprotect themselves." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN RI;VOLUTION
142 (1967).
98. 1 Bay 382, 390 (S. C. 1794).
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the motion it was argued that "[t]he court ought not to award a
certiorari on the mere prayer of an individual, unless he will previously
lay some case before them tending to show that he is or may be affected
by the operation of the by-law, and is, therefore entitled to question its
validity." The court ignored this argument and issued the writ. 3 Al-
though these cases dealt with minor governmental bodies, the fact re-
mains (1) lack of jurisdiction was matter-of-factly equated with uncon-
stitutionality, and (2) a personal interest was not deemed necessary for
an attack upon the validity of a law. Of course this is not conclusive
evidence that contemporary judges had generally assimilated English
practice to the American condition, 1°0 but it is better than unsubstan-
tiated twentieth century speculation that would assign our values to
the eighteenth century founders.
Flast v. Cohen makes yet another dubious contribution to the alleged
constitutional derivation of "standing" in the shape of a distinction
between a "challenged enactment [that] exceeds specific constitutional
limitations," e.g., express prohibitions, and one that "is generally
beyond the powers delegated to Congress."'u0 Whatever its desirability
on policy grounds, the distinction seems to be without historical war-
rant. Little stress was placed in the several ratifying conventions on the
possibility that Congress might act in defiance of express Constitutional
prohibitions; the gnawing fear was rather that Congress might usurp
powers in excess of those conferred. To cite only a few examples,
Wilson assured the Pennsylvania convention that if any congressional
act should be "inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument
in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and
the particular powers of the government being defined, will declare
such laws to be null and void."'01 2 Archibald MacLaine said in the
North Carolina convention that "[i]f Congress should make a law
beyond the powers and spirit of the Constitution, should we not say
to Congress, 'You have no authority to make this law. There are limits
beyond which you cannot go. You cannot exceed the power prescribed
99. 1 NJ.L. 393 (1795). Mark that this argument was cast in terms of what is now
called "standing," not in terms of a failure to state a cause of action because of
damnum absque injuria. Cf. note 47 supra.
100. But see Strong's Case, Kirby 345, 351 (Conn. 1785-88), where counsel on both
sides cited English law on mandamus and the court laid down that the "statute of Anne
should be the rule of the proceeding." Colonial reliance on English authority vms the
practice. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
101. 392 U.S. at 102-03. For Justice Fortas, concurring, "This thesis, slender as its
basis is, provides a 'nexus' for the action." Id. at 115. Cf. Justice Douglas, concurring. id.
at 110.
102. 2 ELLIOT 489.
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by the Constitution.' "o103 Policing of such excesses was paramount in
the minds of the founders, and it may fairly be concluded that they
expected that both jurisdictional usurpations and defiance of prohibi-
tions would equally be set aside. Thus Hamilton coupled the two
forms of excess when, in Federalist 78, arguing from principles of
agency, he derided the notion that those who act under delegation
"may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they
forbid." Similarly Luther Martin, who opposed the Constitution, un-
derstood nonetheless that the judicial power extended both to Acts
"contrary to" and to those "not warranted by the Constitution...
With Justice Harlan, I am "quite unable to understand, how, if a tax-
payer believes that a given expenditure is unconstitutional . . . his in-
terest in the suit can be said necessarily to vary according to the
constitutional provision under which he states his claim."'05
103. 4 id. 161. Governor Johnston reassured North Carolina: "The powers of Con-
gress are all circumscribed, defined, and clearly laid down. So far they may go, but no
farther." 4 id. 64. See also id. 185, 188. In the Massachusetts convention, Samuel Adams
said that the courts would adjudge "void" any federal law "extended beyond the power
granted by the proposed Constitution." 2 id. 131. And John Marshall told the Virginia
convention that were Congress to "go beyond the delegated powers," "to make a law
not warranted by any of the powers enumerated," the courts would "declare it void."
3 id. 553. See also p. 833 supra.
104. 3 FARRAND 220.
105. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 85, 124.
We have seen that the English practice did not require statement of a "cause of ac-
tion" as a prelude to maintenance of what Professor Jaffe has aptly termed a "public
action." See note 11 supra. As regards such actions, I would therefore dissent from Pro-
fessor Wechsler's view that the judicial power extends to all cases arising tinder the
Constitution "only when the standing law, decisional or statutory, provides a remedy to
vindicate the interest that demands protection . . . " Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1959), assuming that by such "In.
terest" he means a "personal stake." My own reading in the records of the several
conventions turned up no relevant limitation beyond Madison's proposal to confine Ar-
ticle III to cases of a "judiciary nature." Suits by strangers were of that nature. To
make existence of a "remedy" a component of the Article III power raises still other
problems. Suppose there is a deprivation of constitutional rights for which no "remedy,"
statutory or decisional, exists, can it be that such a case "arising under the Constitution"
lies outside the "judicial power"? Can it be that an invasion of constitutional rights
would be without remedy? If the Constitution provides its own "remedy" in such cases,
we are engaged in circular reasoning. Suppose that the Court proceeds to fashion a new
remedy-Marshall laid claim in Marbury v. Madison to the common law power to
fashion a remedy for the protection of every right, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)-
and suppose that the existence of a remedy is an indispensable element of "judicial
power"; is not this the creation of bootstrap jurisdiction? Analytically, the Article Ill
"judicial power" is jurisdictional, and to make it depend upon the availability of reme-
dies is to leave the jurisdiction at the mercy of Court or Congress, who can then contract
it at will.
Elsewhere I have sought to show that the Article III authorization to make "excep-
tions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was not designed to permit Congress
to deprive the Court of jurisdiction of constitutional controversies, that a federal court-
either an inferior court or the Supreme Court on appeal from a state court-must be
open for assertion of a constitutional right, and that Congress's power to withdraw or
withhold consent to suit likewise may not be employed to bar access to a federal court
for relief from federal invasions of Constitutional rights. R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. TE
SUPREME COURT (to be published: Harvard University Press, 1969).
The judicial power, I submit, is best viewed as a constitutional grant of jurisdiction of
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There remains the question whether allowance of a suit by a stranger
who lacks a personal interest to challenge action that is in excess of
power granted by the Constitution lies within judicial discretion or is
a matter of right. Except for prohibition, issuance of the other preroga-
tive writs-mandamus, certiorari, and quo warranto-seems dearly to
have been a matter of judicial discretion.100 Coke's record of Articulo
Cleri, however, suggests that the writ of prohibition would issue as a
matter of right. Replying in the Tenth Answer to the objection that a
plaintiff who sued in the ecclesiastical court should be precluded from
obtaining prohibition of his own action, the judges stated:
None may pursue in the ecclesiastical court for that which the
kings court ought to hold plea of, but upon information thereof
given to the kings courts, either by the plaintife, or by any mere
stranger, they are to be prohibited, because they deal in that which
appertaineth not to their jurisdiction... [P]rohibitions thereupon
are not of favour, but of justice to be granted. 07
the subject matter described in Article III, which exists independently of whether a liti-
gant can state a cause of action. A word is in order about the mistaken identification ofjurisdiction with failure to state a cause of action, of which the classic example is
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 140, 147 (1939). In that case eighteen
power companies sought to enjoin operation of the Tennessee Valley Authority, asserting
that it lacked constitutional power to act in the premises. The Court held that tile
plaintiff lacked standing because the "damage consequent on competition, otherwise
lawful, is in such circumstances damn urn absque injuria .... id. 140, the Latin tag
generally associated with injuries that do not give rise to a cause of action. Compare.
note 47 supra. Failure to state a cause of action is not normally regarded as jurisdic-
tional; it "calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a disnissal for want of
jurisdiction." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). One may have a cause of action
and fail, for example, to come within the "diversity" jurisdiction of Article III, or come
within that jurisdiction and fail to state a cause of action. Justice Frankfurter justly
objected to "confounding the requirements for establishing a substantive cause of action
with the requirements of diversity jurisdiction." Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91. 98
(1957) (dissent); Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1959). No more
should the other branch of the "'judicial power"-"case or controversy"-be identified
with statement of a cause of action. It needs to be kept firmly in mind that "a court
may have jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action though the complaint therein
does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Weiss v. Los Angeles Broad-
casting Co., 163 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1947). "Jurisdiction .. . is not defeated . ..by
the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action." Bell v. Hood. 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
106. Certiorari: 1 M. BACON, ABRIDGMcNT, "Certiorari" (A) (3d ed. 1763); Rex v. Lewis,
98 Eng. Rep. 288 (1769); Regina v. Justices of Surrey, [1870] L.I5 Q.B. 466, 472-73.
Quo Warranto: For early statutory requirement of leave of court, see SnoRrr 113-14;
Rex v. Trelawney, 97 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1765); Rex v. Wardropero 98 Eng. Rep. 23 (1766).
Mandamus: 3 M. BACON, ABREDGMENT, "Mandamus" (E) (3d ed. 1768): the Court of
King's Bench "are not obliged to [issue mandamus] in all Cases wherein it may sean
proper, but herein may exercise a discretionary power, as well in refusing, as granting
such Writ ..."
107. 2 IxSr.* 607. Blackstone states that from Arliculo l en "much may be collected
concerning the reasons of granting and methods of proceeding upon prohibitions."
3 IW. BLACKSMNE, COsrssTARIES* 113. Professor Henderson states that tile "theoretical
emphasis" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries "was on 'jurisdiction,' an elusive
concept of the agency's or justices' 'power' to hear the question at all or to take a given
action. Questions that had been labelled as 'jurisdictional' could be reviewed as of right."
HFNDERSON 6.
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In modern terms, such writs would issue as of right. Articulo Cleri re-
mained vital in England, where in 1875 its principles were powerfully
restated in Worthington v. Jeffries by Justice Brett.10 8
Our concern, however, is with how English law appeared to the eyes
of a colonial lawyer who did not have the benefit of nineteenth century
cases. It is generally acknowledged that at the time of the Revolution
and before, there was considerable disagreement as to whether prohibi-
tion, even in the case of one who had a personal interest, was a matter
108. These authorities show that the ground of decision, in considering whether
prohibition is or is not to be granted, is not whether the individual suitor has or
has not suffered damage, but is, whether the royal prerogative has been encroached
upon by reason of the prescribed order of administration of justice having been
disobeyed. If this were not so, it seems difficult to understand why a stranger may
interfere at all .... If it is the absolute duty of the superior Court to enforce
order on being convinced of a breach of it by information given by the defendant
in the suit below, why should it be a less absolute duty if it is convinced of the
same breach of order by information given by a stranger? Order is no less broken,
the prerogative is no less invaded . . . . [T]he real ground of the Interference by
prohibition is not that the defendant below is individually damaged, but that the
cause is drawn in aliud examen, that public order in administration of law is
broken. And inasmuch as the duty of enforcing such order is imposed on the
superior Courts, and the issue of a writ of prohibition is the means given to them
by law of enforcing such order, it seems to us that, upon principle and in the ab.
sence of enactment, it must be their duty to issue such writ whenever they are
clearly convinced by legal evidence, by whomsoever brought before them, that an
inferior Court is acting without jurisdiction, or exceeding its jurisdiction ...
Justice Brett further remarked that in Articulo Cleri "the duty is declared In
absolute terms applicable to all cases."
L.R. 10 C.P, 379, 382, 383.
Although the nineteenth century English cases exhibit some differences of opinion,
the later and more numerous cases are with Brett. Among the latter is Burder v. Veley,
113 Eng. Rep. 801 (Q.B. 1840), where Denman, C.J., stated: "In whatever stage that fact
['want of jurisdiction'] is made manifest, either by the Crown, or by any one of its
subjects, we are bound to interpose," id. at 812-13; "the Courts of Westminster Hall
have no discretion to award or refuse the writ, but are bound to award it." 1d. at 810.
An influential case contra is Forster v. Forster, 4 B. & S. 187, 199 (Q,B. 1863), in which
Cockburn, C. J., distinguished the case of a stranger from that of a party aggrieved, stat-
ing that although the Court will listen to a stranger, "[Y]et this is not ex debito justitlie,
but a matter upon which the Court may properly exercise its discretion .. " Cockburn's
statement apparently was approved in Mayor of London v. Cox, [18651 L.R. 2 E. & 1.
App. 239, 280 (H. L.), where the same point "came indirectly before the House of
Lords." So Master of Rolls Jessel concluded in Chambers v. Green, [18751 L.R. 20 Eq.
Cases 552, 555, choosing to rely on Forster and Cox rather than on the subsequent
opinions in Worthington v. Jeffries. When Chambers v. Green was later pressed on
Justice Brett, he adhered to Worthington in Ellis v. Fleming, [1876] L.R. 1 C.P. Div. 237,
239-40.
In Farquhai-son v. Morgan, [1894] 1 Q.B. 552, 556, the Court of Appeals followed the
Coke rule; Lord Halsbury stated:
It has long been settled that, where an objection to the jurisdiction of an inferior
Court appears on the face of the proceedings, it is immaterial by what means and
by whom the Court is informed of such objection, The Court must protect the
prerogative of the Crown and the due course of the administration of justice by
prohibiting the inferior Court from proceeding in matters as to which It is ap.
parent that it has no jurisdiction . . . . I find no authority justifying the with-
holding of a writ of prohibition in such case.
Professor de Smith states that "If a defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the proceeding, the application may be brought . .. by a complete stranger . - . and
the court is obliged to allow the application." DE SmiTH 427.
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of discretion or of right.1 9 When regard is had to tis division of
opinion, noted in Bacon's Abridgment,"" and to the discretionary
nature of the other prerogative writs, it is difficult to attribute to
colonial lawyers the view that the writ of prohibition had to issue to a
stranger as of right. Neither, however, may we attribute to them the
view that prohibition could be denied out of hand, for Bacon's A bridg-
ment emphasized that "the Superior Courts are at liberty to exercise a
legal Discretion herein, but not an arbitrary one, in refusing Prohibi-
tions, where in such like cases they have been granted .... "I"
Finally, there appears to be no impediment to the creation by Con-
gress of an absolute right to prohibition, even when sought by a
stranger.112 It has never been suggested that there are any limits on the
creation of the cognate "informers" actions, which create indefeasible
causes of action at least until Congress withdraws jurisdiction from the
courts.1 3 Taking note of the "informers" statutes, and doubtless cog-
nizant of "relators" actions as well, Judge Jerome Frank drew from
FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station 14 and Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC"5 the proposition that "Congress can constitutionally
enact a statute conferring on any non-official person. . . authority to
bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers; for then... there is an actual controversy.. . Such persons,
so authorized, are so to speak, private Attorney Generals."'1 6 When this
statement appeared in 1943, those who were under the spell of the
Court's earlier decisions regarded it as a daring break with tradition,
whereas in fact it is solidly rooted in the common law. It is difficult to
109. Ford v. Welden, 83 Eng. Rep. 50 (1664); Clay v. Snelgrove, 91 Eng. Rep. 1285.
1286 (1701); Parish of Aston v. Castle-Birmidge Chapel, 80 Eng. Rep. 215 (c. 1603-1625).
See also Mayor of London v. Cox, [1865] L.R. 2 E. & I. App. 239, 278 (H.L).
110. 4 A. BACON, ABRmGA NT, "Prohibition" (3d ed. 1768).
111. Id. Of the related quo warranto writ, Lard Mansfield said the Court must "exer-
cise a sound discretion." Rex v. Wardroper, 98 Eng. Rep. 23 (1766).
There "is no clear decision that the court can use its discretion arbitrarily" in the
field of certiorari, and discretionary denials of certiorari involve cases where evidence
"showed ground on which the adjudication attacked would be upheld." Gordon,
Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi, 71 L.Q. REv. 483, 485 (1955).
112. For the contrary view, see note 10 supra.
113. Blackstone said that "by commencing the suit the informer has made the popular
action his own private action, and it is not in the power of the crown, or of any thing
but parliament, to release the informer's interest.' 2 W. BtACFxSTE, Co.tLr,ArnEs*
437. See also Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680, 681 (2d Cir. 1945), which
held that Congress may deprive the district court of jurisdiction after the informer has
filed his action, leaving him to seek compensation, if any, in the Court of Claims.
114. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
115. 316 U.S. 4 (1942). For discussion of Sanders and Scripps.Howard, see Jaffe, Private
Actions 272-74.
116. Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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see how the power of Congress to confer standing by statute can be
open to question when its power to create informers' actions is beyond
doubt." 7 Since the monetary recovery is only an incentive to, rather
than an element of, the action, it cannot be that the payment of a
financial inducement to a stranger alone legitimizes his suit. This
would too much resemble Charles Lamb's Chinaman who thought it
necessary to burn down the house in order to roast the pig.
In sum, the notion that the constitution demands injury to a personal
interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional action
is historically unfounded. The "matters that were the traditional con-
cern of the courts in Westminster" upon which such an interpretation
of the "case or controversy" phrase has been premised were not in fact
as limited as Frankfurter and his successors have supposed. Public
suits instituted by strangers to curb action in excess of jurisdiction
were well established in English law at the time Article III was drafted.
Nor were the concerns of the Founders with separation of powers and
advisory opinions germane to the issues involved in standing to chal-
lenge action either in defiance of or beyond the authority granted by
the Constitution. There may well be policy arguments in favor of a
"personal interest" limitation on standing, but they cannot rest on
historically-derived constitutional compulsions.
117. Justice Harlan, who questions the wisdom of broadening the standing of
strangers, states that "[a]ny hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the
three branches of the Government would be substantially diminished if public actions
had been pertinently authorized by Congress and the President." Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. at 116, 131-32 (1968) (dissent). See also note 79 supra.
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